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LIST OF PARTIES 
Jack Hyrum Hallett is the Appellant, and was the 
Defendant in the original Trial Court. 
The State of Utah is the Respondent herein and was the 
Plaintiff in the original Trial Court. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) SUPPLEMENTAL 
) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) 
vs. ) CASE NO: 890215-CA 
JACK HYRUM HALLETT, ) 
) PRIORITY: 2 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
An Appeal from a Judgment of the Seventh 
Judicial District Court of 
Duchesne County, State of Utah 
Honorable Richard C. Davidson, Presiding 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from seven felony convictions in the 
District Court of Duchesne County, The Honorable Richard C. 
Davidson, Presiding. A Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
was granted by the Honorable Davis S. Young and the State 
appealed that Writ. This Court after hearing determined 
that pursuant to State v. Jackson, 635 P. 2d 36, the Defen-
dant below should be granted a direct appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
RE: CASE NO. 1149 
On January 6, 1984, the Appellant was charged with 
Forcible Sexual Abuse, a Second Degree felony at Roosevelt, 
Utah, on or about January , 1984. (R-3) . Preliminary 
hearing was held on January 26, 1984, and the Appellant was 
bound over to District Court. (R-l) He was arraigned on 
February 14, 1984, (R-18) , and trial was set for May 17, 
1984. (R-16) On March 21, 1984, the Appellants attorney, 
Anthony J. Famulary, filed a "Withdrawal of Counsel". 
On May 3, 1984, an Amended Information was filed 
alleging the same offense but changed the date of the 
offense to "from March, 1983 to early January, 1984". 
(R-20) At trial the alleged victim, April Cordle, tes-
tified, starting at R-88 and ending at R-100. She testified 
that she did not know how many times she was touched but it 
was more than once and less than ten times. (R-93) On 
pages R-94 & 95, April discussed two touchings. One was 
approximately two weeks prior to October 17, 1984, and the 
other was approximately two weeks prior to that. The record 
of April's testimony is completely void of any incident 
between March, 1983 and January, 19 84. 
The record (Case No. 1149) is completely void of any 
reference to the Appellant being arraigned on the Amended 
Information. The record is void of any information that 
would indicate that the Appellant even knew of its existence 
and furthermore, he was not offered a new preliminary 
hearing nor did he waive one. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
RE; CASE NOS. 84CR99D, 84CR100D, 84CR101D, 
84CR102, 84CR103D, 84CR104D 
On October 17, 1984, trial was scheduled on Case No. 
1149. The alleged victim and her mother did not appear and 
the case was continued. (R-25) 
On October 18, 1984, the Appellant was charged in the 
above six cases. (Four witness tampering charges, Third 
Degree felonies and two sex abuse charges) . 
Since Mr. James R. Hall had been appointed to represent 
Mr. Hallett on October 9, 1984, (R-27), he was also appoint-
ed to represent Mr. Hallett on the six new charges. Mr. 
Hallett was arrested on October 18, 1984, arraigned on the 
six new charges and the Court ordered preliminary hearings 
immediately following the arraignment. (R-2, 11, 25, 37, 
49, 61). There is nothing in the record to indicate that 
Mr. Hallett waived any right to having a reasonable time to 
prepare for a preliminary hearing, and there is no in-
dication that his attorney objected to the immediate prelim-
inary hearing. 
In addition, the two new sex abuse charges (84CR103) 
and (84CR104) were charged as Third Degree felonies. He was 
bound over on Third Degree felonies and at the time of 
trial, and after a jury waiver, the Prosecutor made a motion 
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to amend to Second Degree felonies. Mr. Hallett's attorney 
did not object. 
Mr. Hallet was arraigned in District Court on October 
22, 1984, and went to trial on all seven charges on October 
31, 1984, just 13 days after he was charged. 
The trial record (R-3 & 4) includes some discussion 
about trying all seven cases together. Mr. Hallett was 
present during these discussions but did not say anything 
and it is very clear that he was not informed of a right to 
separate trial on each of the sex abuse cases and two 
separate trials on the four tampering charges. Also, Mr. 
Hall stipulated that a Mr Lawren^-, Szaraniec was a qual-
ified psychologist. (TR-61). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
TESTIMONY 
Carolyn Chapman, a former member of the Sheriff!s 
office, testified at Appellant's trial (Tr. 68 to 73) about 
her conversations with April Cordle and the things April 
told her. Chapmanfs testimony from page 69, line 6 to page 
72, line 8 was all hearsay from either April or April's 
mother, Francis. 
Mr. Thomas Harrison added additional hearsay from April 
(Tr. 21, line 25) as follows: 
Yes, April explained an inappropri-
ate sexual relationship between she and 
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her mother's boyfriend, and asking her 
who her mother's boyfriend was, she 
stated Mr. Jack Hallett. 
Additional testimony by Mr. Harrison involving hearsay 
(Tr. 28 & 29) is as follows: 
A. Yes, April shared with me that 
Mr. Hallett would touch her under her 
clothing, and she showed me that behav-
ior with the use we used the dolls. We 
use dolls with clothing on, and she 
showed me that behavior. She talked 
about him touching her under her cloth-
ing with his hand on her chest and she 
pointed to her breast. She touched her 
breast as well as her genitalia, and she 
pointed and touched down to her genital 
area, to her vulva and mons area. She, 
in investigating it further, showed 
absolutely no sign of insertion 
vaginally. It was a genital fondling 
that she shared with me, no vaginal 
insertion. 
Q. Did April share with you any 
of her feelings about an ongoing phys-
ical relationship without the particular 
fondling? 
A. Yes, she did. 
Q. What was the nature of that? 
A. She shared with me that Mr. 
Hallett would hold her, what she called, 
to quote her, "squeeze me like lovers 
hug, not daddy's hug." 
When I asked her what that meant 
she said, "He would hug me real tight 
and press me real close to him and not 
let me go." 
April's mother, Francis Cordle, also testified about 
conversations with April as follows (Tr. 52) : 
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Q. When April first talked to you 
did she describe what Jack had done to 
her? 
A, Yes. 
Q. What did she say? 
Mr. Hall: There again I would 
object to any hearsay testimony. 
The Court: Rule 76-5-411. 
Overruled. 
The Witness: What was the ques-
tion? 
Q. (By Mr. Draney) What did she 
tell you Jack had done to her? 
A. She said she was laying in bed 
and he came in and put his hands down in 
her pajamas and then on her breasts, 
too. 
Q. When you say don in her 
pajamas, did she indicate where that 
was? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was it in the crotch area? 
A. Yes. 
At the time of trial, April Cordle was 19 years of age 
(Tr. 70). Substantial hearsay testimony was admitted under 
Title 76-5-411 based on testimony of Lawrence Szaraniec that 
April was of about 9% years mentally (Tr. 12) . Title 
76-5-411 at the time of trial referred to a child under 10. 
Utah has not ruled whether 76-5-411 means chronological age 
or mental age. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Trial Court imposed an illegal sentence by 
delegating to the Division of Corrections the determination 
of consecutive versus concurrent sentences. 
2. Appellant was denied competent counsel. 
3. Appellant was denied his rights to due process in 
Case 1149 when the charge was amended after preliminary 
hearing. 
4. Mental age as opposed to chronological age does 
not permit hearsay evidence pursuant to 76-5-411. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED AN ILLEGAL 
SENTENCE BY DELEGATING TO THE DIVISION 
OF CORRECTIONS THE DETERMINATION OF 
CONSECUTIVE VERSUS CONCURRENT SENTENCES. 
As a part of the Trial Courtfs "Commitment Order" (Rec. 
P-8), the Court ordered as follows: 
The Court declined to determine whether 
the aforementioned sentence should be 
consecutively or concurrent and leaves 
that decision to the Division of Cor-
rections. 
The Utah State law governing concurrent versus consecu-
tive sentences is set forth in Title 76-3-401(1) U.C.A. 1953 
as follows: 
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(1) Subject to the limitations of 
subsections (2) through (5) , a court 
shall determine, if a defendant has been 
adjudged guilty of more than one felony 
offense, whether to impose concurrent or 
consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
Sentences shall run concurrently unless 
the court states, in the sentence, that 
they shall run consecutively. 
Article V of the Constitution of Utah reads as follows: 
The powers of the government of the 
State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legisla-
tive, the Executive, and the Judicial; 
and no person charged with the exercise 
of powers properly belonging to one of 
these departments, shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein 
expressly directed or permitted. 
The Trial Courr in leaving that decision to the dis-
cretion of the Division of Corrections violated the Defen-
dant's rights pursuant to the above statute and Article by 
delegating to the Executive branch of government a matter 
that is strictly a Judicial function. 
Had the Court merely not stated whether the sentences 
would be consecutive or concurrent, they would be deemed to 
run concurrent, 76-3-401 U.C.A., but by sentencing in the 
manner he did, the Division of Corrections would probably 




APPELLANT WAS DENIED COMPETENT COUNSEL. 
(A) 
Trial counsel stipulated that a Mr. Lawrence Szaraniec 
was a qualified'psychologist. (TR-61) 
Title 58-25-(1-12) U.C.A, governs the licensing of 
psychologists. Counsel for Appellant checked with the Utah 
Department of Business Regulations and was informed that 
they have no record of a Lawrence Szaraniec. Mr. Szaraniec 
testified he was the psychologist for the Duchesne County 
School District (TR-60), and therefore the Respondent may 
contend that he is exempt under 58-25-6 U.C.A., however, 
that exemption would require that his activities be re-
stricted to the "educational institution". That statute 
follows with emphasis added: 
58-25-6. Exemption from operation of 
chapter. 
This chapter does not limit the 
activities and the use of an official 
title on the part of a person who has 
not obtained a license and is in the 
employ of a federal agency or a duly 
chartered educational institution, if 
those activities are a part of the 
duties in his salaried position, and if 
those activities are performed solely on 
behalf of a federal agency or the 
educational institution. Any person 
employed as a psychologist by a state, 
county, or municipal agency or other 
political subdivision of the state 
before July 1, 1981, and who maintains 
employment in the same state, county, or 
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municipal agency or other political 
subdivison, may continue to use the 
official title without obtaining a 
license to practice psychology in this 
state. This chapter does not limit the 
activities and services of a student, 
intern, or resident in psychology, 
pursuing a course of study at an accred-
ited educational institution recognized 
by the division as providing qualified 
training and experience for psycholo-
gists, if those activities and services 
constitute a part of his supervised 
course of study, and if that person is 
designated by such titles as "psycho-
logical intern," "psychological train-
ee," or other title clearly indicating 
his training status. This chapter does 
not prevent members of other professions 
from doing work of a psychological 
nature if those persons do not represent 
themselves to the public as being 
psychologists, except w-ien so licensed. 
April Cordle was 19 years old in 1984 (TR-70) . Mr. 
Szaraniec's testimony was critical because he testified that 
April's chronological age was between eight and a third and 
nine and on-half years. (TR-63) The obvious purpose for 
such testimony was to dispute any question of consent. 
Consent is a primary question since from the time Mr. 
Hallett was originally charged (January, 1984) to the time 
of trial, April Cordle and her mother continued to live with 
Mr. Hallett. (TR-113) 
At the time of submitting this Brief, documentation has 
not been received as to the fact that Mr. Szaraniec is not 
licensed. As soon as it is received it will be submitted to 
the Court as a supplement to the Brief. 
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(B) 
We would contend that when an attorney is assigned to a 
case on October 9, 1984 (Case 1149) and six more charges are 
filed on October 18, 1984, and the attorney allows those 
cases to go directly into preliminary hearing and then to 
trial 13 days later, that he did not have sufficient time to 
prepare for trial. There is no indication that he did 
anything to rebutt the psychological testimony. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 7-P, pages 4 and 5 indicate that there was a Stipu-
lation between Mr. Hall and Mr. Draney to hold the prelimi-
nary hearing immediately and even though Mr. Hallett was 
there, there is nothing on the record to indicate that he 
was consulted. 
Title 77-35-7 U.C.A. sets forth the procedure before a 
magistrate. Specifically subsection (4)(v) states as 
follows: 
The magistrate shall thereupon allow the 
defendant reasonable time, and 
opportunity to consult with counsel 
before proceeding further... 
There was nothing in the record of the arraignment and 
preliminary hearing to show that Mr. Hallett was advised of 
additional time to prepare. It should also be kept in mind 
that Mr. Hallett testified at the Habeas Corpus hearing that 
at that time he only had an eighth grade education. (Page 9 
of Habeas Corpus Transcript.) 
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(C) 
The Appellant was entitled to three separate trials on 
the Sexual Abuse charges and two separate trials on the four 
tampering charges. 
Mr. Hall did not effectively represent his client in 
combining all those charges for one trial. The psychologi-
cal effect of hearing seven different cases at one time 
could substantially affect the most unbiased of Judges. 
We recognize that the Appellant carries the burden of 
showing ineffective counsel. State v. Pursefell, 746 P. 2d 
270. This Court in State v Pursefell; supra, held that 
serious lack of preparation could give rise to a violation 
of a Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. 
POINT III. 
APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO DUE 
PROCESS IN CASE 1149 WHEN THE CHARGE WAS 
AMENDED AFTER PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
The record in Case No. 1149 is void of any reference to 
advising the Defendant of the amendment or his right to a 
new preliminary hearing. In addition, it gave the State a 
period of ten months (march through December) to prove a 
case. Defense counsel did not request a Bill of Particulars 
to the down time and therefore could not have given thought 
to a possible alibi defense. 
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POINT IV. 
MENTAL AGE AS OPPOSED TO CHRONOLOGICAL 
AGE DOES NOT PERMIT HEARSAY EVIDENCE 
PURSUANT TO 76-5-411. 
The State of Washington has ruled in a similar situa-
tion chronological age and not mental age is the determining 
factor when considering competency of a witness. State v. 
Smith, 650 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1982) at 202 states as follows: 
According to her theory the patient was, 
in law, a child within the meaning of 
CrR 6.12(c). We recently held in State 
v. Froehlich, 96 Wash,2d 301, 635 P.2d 
127 (1981), that RCW 5,60.050(2), which 
is couched in the same language as CrR 
6.12(c), except that the rule applies to 
all children while the statute applies 
only to children under 10 years of age, 
cannot be read to apply to persons over 
10 years old. It was contended there, 
as it is here, that an adult should be 
regarded as a child, in law, if his 
mental development is comparable. The 
rule, like the statute, applies only to 
those who fall within its terms. 
A similar holding came from the New Mexico Court of 
Appeals in State v. Doe, 642 P.2d 201 at 204: 
[7] The numerous references to age 
in the children!s code are references to 
years of age, not mental age. See §§ 
32-1-3(A) and (B), 32-1-9(A), 
32-l-19(C) , 32-1-20 (A) , 32-1-27(1) , 
32-1-29(A)(1), 32-1-30(A)(1), N.M.S.A. 
1978 (1981 Repl.Supp.). A "year" is a 
period of solar days. Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary, (1966). 
Compare Matter of Doe, 89 N.M. 507, 554 
P.2d 669 (Ct.App. 1976) . 
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[8,9] The age of fifteen years 
means the passage of fifteen of the 
units of time which are called years. 
Paragraph F does not refer to "mental 
age," and does not exclude use of the 
admissions and statements made by the 
child to the three witnesses. 
Although State v. Nelson, 113 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (July 
25, 19 89) did not deal with mental age versus chronological 
age, Justice Howe did hold as follows: 
Defendant lastly contends that the 
out-of-court statement of the victim 
should not have been admitted at trial. 
At the time of trial, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-411 allowed the admission of 
out-of-court statements made by alleged 
victims of sexual abuse who were under 
twelve years of age pursuant to Utah 
Code Anno. § 77-35-15.5(11, (2) or (3) 
(Supp. 1989) (amended 1988). Since the 
victim in this case was thirteen, that 
section was inapplicable. (emphasis 
added) 
As noted in Appellant's original brief, April offei~ed 
no testimony concerning Case Number 1149, therefore con-
viction on that charge was completely on hearsay. Such 
hearsay is in violation of Title 76-5-411 and State v. 
Nelson, (supra). 
Lawrence Szaraniec in addition to not being certified 
(See original Brief), gave testimony as to April's truthful-
ness (Tr. 15) contrary to the foundational requirements of 
State v. Rimmasch, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 20. Although Appel-
lant's attorney stipulated (improperly) to Szaraniec1s 
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qualifications as a psychologist there was never any testi-
mony as to his qualifications at determining the truthful-
ness of a witness. 
CONCLUSION 
We would respectfully submit that the Appellant was 
denied his Sixth Amendment right to competent counsel. We 
further contend that the record speaks for itself on that 
issue and his conviction should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ y day of October, 
1989. 
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